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Introduction and Summary of Conclusions 
This report describes the results of the second in a series of ongoing experimental studies 
of public perceptions of the risks and benefits of nanotechnology. The studies are aimed at iden-
tifying how public attitudes toward nanotechnology are likely to evolve as the public learns more 
about this novel science. They also seek to identify concrete strategies for improving public un-
derstanding of scientific information on the risks and benefits of nanotechnology as such infor-
mation is developed. The first study in this series found that when individuals who know little 
about nanotechnology are exposed to information about it, they tend to polarize in their opinions 
along lines that reflect their cultural predispositions toward technological and environmental 
risks generally (Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gastil, & Cohen 2008). This study examined whether 
and how the perceived cultural outlooks of information sources would affect public reactions to 
arguments about the risks and benefits of nanotechnology.  
Key findings and conclusions were as follows: 
1. When unattributed to identifiable advocates, arguments about the risks and benefits of 
nanotechnology generate polarization of beliefs. Relative to persons not exposed to such argu-
ments, individuals exposed to opposing sets of arguments divide along various lines, including 
race and cultural orientation. The gap between people who are generally inclined to credit and 
those generally inclined to dismiss claims of environmental risk widens dramatically after expo-
sure to such arguments. 
2. When such arguments are attributed to identifiable advocates, the impact of the ar-
guments on subjects is highly sensitive to the perceived cultural outlooks of the advocates. When 
persons of diverse cultural outlooks observe an advocate whose values they share advancing an 
argument they are predisposed to accept, and an advocate whose values they reject advancing an 
argument they are predisposed to resist, the usual association between persons’ cultural world-
views and their positions on nanotechnology becomes more extreme. When those same advo-
cates are assigned the opposite positions, however, individuals observing the debate form percep-
tions of nanotechnology risks diametrically opposed to the ones normally associated with their 
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own cultural outlooks. Finally, when there is no consistent relationship between the perceived 
values of advocates and positions taken on nanotechnology risk and benefits, cultural polariza-
tion is neutralized. 
3. These findings reinforce the conclusion, reached in the first study in this series, that a 
strategy of public education that focuses only on disseminating accurate information cannot re-
liably be expected to generate convergence on accurate public beliefs about the risks and benefits 
of nanotechnology. People tend to credit and dismiss arguments about nanotechnology in pat-
terns that reflect their cultural predispositions toward environmental and technological risks, and 
thus polarize on cultural lines, a phenomenon known as biased assimilation and polarization. 
The delivery of arguments by qualified experts will not necessarily counteract this effect, and 
indeed could easily accentuate it, because of the tendency of persons to assign greater credibility 
to policy advocates who share their values and who, as a result, are likely to be espousing posi-
tions that fit listeners’ cultural predispositions. 
4. Scientists, policymakers, and others interested in promoting enlightened public 
evaluation of the best available information on nanotechnology risks should take affirmative 
steps to create a deliberative climate that neutralizes biased assimilation and polarization. One 
such step would be to assure that members of the public do not form the impression that there is 
a link between the cultural values of policy advocates and particular positions on nanotechnology 
risks. Since credibility depends on trust, which depends largely on shared cultural outlooks, par-
ties interested in communicating accurate information should be attentive to assuring that they 
avail themselves of information providers of diverse cultural orientations. In this condition of 
“advocacy pluralism,” members of the public are less likely to divide along cultural lines.  
5. Additional research is warranted to identify further concrete steps that can be taken to 
assure a culturally unbiased deliberative climate for public evaluation of sound information on 
nanotechnology’s risks and benefits. 
Toward a Comprehensive Strategy for Promoting Informed Understanding of Nanotech-
nology’s Risks and Benefits 
The future of nanotechnology will be determined in large measure by the public’s as-
sessment of its potential benefits and risks. The Cultural Cognition Project (CCP), with the sup-
port and collaboration of the Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies (PEN), is engaged in a se-
ries of studies to determine how the public’s perceptions of those matters is likely to evolve. 
These studies are not aimed at promoting any particular view on the relative magnitude of the 
benefits and risks of nanotechnology—a matter that is likely not susceptible to definitive assess-
ment at this time. The studies are motivated, however, by a commitment to identifying concrete 
steps that scientists, regulators, and others can take to assure that the public’s assessment of 
nanotechnology’s risks and benefits reflects the best available scientific information that is cur-
rently available and that will become available as evaluations of nanotechnology continue. 
The first study conducted as part of this series underscored that such an outcome cannot 
necessarily be expected to occur spontaneously (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, Gastil, & Cohen 2007; 
Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gastil, & Cohen 2008). That study used experimental methods to test a 
hypothesis suggested by existing public opinion polls relating to nanotechnology. Those polls 
show that the vast majority of the American public has heard little, if anything, about nanotech-
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nology, but that those who are relatively familiar with it view it favorably (Peter D. Hart Associ-
ates 2007). A hypothesis one might form on the basis of these polls, then, is that as they learn 
more about it, members of the public currently unfamiliar with nanotechnology will likewise 
form the view that the benefits of nanotechnology predominate over its risks. 
The results of the first CCP/PEN study furnished no support for this hypothesis. That 
study demonstrated that, when supplied with information, individuals unfamiliar with nanotech-
nology do not respond in a uniformly positive way. Indeed, they do not respond uniformly at all. 
On the contrary, such individuals polarize along cultural lines: when exposed to the same body 
of balanced and accurate information, persons who hold relatively egalitarian and communitarian 
values infer that nanotechnology is risky, whereas persons who hold relatively individualistic 
values infer that it is not (Kahan, Braman, Slovic, Gastil, & Cohen 2008). 
This result derives from two interrelated psychological dynamics. One is cultural cogni-
tion, which refers to the tendency of people to conform their factual beliefs about putatively dan-
gerous activities to their cultural appraisals of those activities (DiMaggio 1997; Douglas & Wil-
davsky 1982; Kahan & Braman 2006). It is easier, psychologically speaking, to believe that be-
havior one finds noble is socially beneficial, and that behavior one finds base is socially harmful, 
than vice versa. Persons with individualistic outlooks value commerce and markets, and are thus 
predisposed to discount claims that such activities pose dangers to the environment that would 
justify restricting them. Persons who hold egalitarian values, in contrast, are very sensitive to en-
vironmental and technological risks, recognition of which justifies regulating activities—
commerce and industry—that they view as sources of unjust forms of inequality. People who 
hold communitarian values also readily credit claims of environmental risk because they see un-
constrained commercial activity as symbolic of unconstrained pursuit of self-interest (Kahan, 
Braman, Gastil, Slovic, & Mertz 2007). 
The other relevant dynamic is biased assimilation and polarization (Lord, Ross, & Leper 
1979). It has been shown that individuals are disposed to screen information in a biased way 
based on its consistency with their prior beliefs or predispositions (biased assimilation). As a re-
sult, when people with different beliefs and predispositions are exposed to factual information, 
they do not converge but rather grow even more extreme in their disagreements (polarization). 
Putting these dynamics together, one would expect that when persons who are unfamiliar 
with nanotechnology are exposed to information about it, they would draw inferences from it 
consistent with their cultural predispositions toward environmental and technological risks gen-
erally. As a result, such individuals would polarize, rather than form a uniform, much less a uni-
formly positive, view. That is exactly what our experiment found. 
Such a result suggests that one cannot take for granted the emergence of public consensus 
as sound scientific information about nanotechnology’s risks and benefits is disseminated to the 
public. Those who find such information congenial to their values are likely to credit it, but those 
who find such information uncongenial will be inclined to dismiss it and rely instead on less- 
sound information that is more supportive of their predispositions. 
This unhappy outcome, however, is not necessarily inevitable. Studies have identified 
various risk-communication techniques that counteract the biasing effects of cultural cognition 
(Cultural Cognition Project 2007; Kahan, Slovic, Braman, & Gastil 2006). CCP and PEN are 
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currently studying how these techniques can be adapted to promote informed understanding of 
the risks and benefits of nanotechnology. The study that forms the basis of this report identifies 
one such technique.  
Nanotechnology Risk Perceptions and the Cultural Credibility Heuristic 
Overview 
The aim of the current study was to examine how the cultural credibility heuristic inter-
acts with biased assimilation and polarization in the setting of nanotechnology risk perceptions. 
Because most individuals lack the time and expertise necessary to make sense of scientific in-
formation on risk and other policy issues, they naturally rely on those whom they trust to deter-
mine what information to believe. The people they are inclined to trust are those who share their 
cultural outlooks (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, & Gastil 2006). This dynamic can accentuate cultural 
polarization if information providers and advocates themselves are generally divided along cul-
tural lines—as one might expect them to be by virtue of cultural cognition. But the cultural 
credibility heuristic can also potentially ameliorate such polarization if information advocates 
take positions that run contrary to the cultural predispositions of those inclined to defer to them. 
The current study used experimental methods to examine these possible effects in the context of 
the debate about the risks and benefits of nanotechnology. 
 
Study design 
The study involved a sample of approximately 1,600 American adults and was conducted 
over a period of several weeks between June and August 2007. The subjects were drawn from a 
nationally representative panel recruited by Knowledge Networks and participated in experi-
ments using Knowledge Network’s on-line testing facilities.1  
Data on various individual characteristics were measured before the study. These in-
cluded subjects’ socio-demographic characteristics, political ideologies, and party affiliations. 
They also included subjects’ cultural worldviews, which were measured using two scales: (1) 
Hierarchy-Egalitarianism, which assesses subjects’ relative preferences for forms of social or-
ganization that reflect authority and role-based prerogatives, on the one hand, versus forms that 
reflect highly egalitarian relations, on the other; and (2) Individualism-Communitarianism, which 
assesses their relative preference for forms of social organization that give priority to individual 
and collective claims, respectively (Kahan, Braman, Gastil, Slovic, & Mertz 2007). Individuals 
were characterized as either “Hierarchs” or “Egalitarians” and as either “Individualists” or 
“Communitarians” depending on where their scores fell in relation to the median of all subjects 
on each scale. 
The study occurred in two stages. The first stage evaluated how exposure to balanced ar-
guments unattributed to identifiable advocates would influence subjects’ perceptions of 
nanotechnology risks and benefits. The second evaluated how exposure to the same arguments 
 
1 Additional information on the characteristics of the sample and on Knowledge Networks’ on-line testing facilities 
appears in Appendix B. 
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would influence participants’ perceptions when the arguments were attributed to advocates rec-
ognized as holding one or another set of cultural values.  
 
Stage 1: The polarizing effects of arguments 
The first stage of the current study involved approximately 800 subjects. Half the subjects 
(the “no-argument condition”) received no information about nanotechnology aside from a brief 
description of it.2 The other half (“the argument condition”) received brief and balanced argu-
ments, one proposing the suspension of nanotechnology development pending further research 
into its potential risks, and the other defending continued development pending such research.3 
Subjects’ perceptions of the risks and benefits of nanotechnology were measured on a six-point 
scale composed of seven items. The scale was coded so that the higher the score, the greater the 
concern with nanotechnology risks relative to benefits.4 Much like the first CCP/PEN study of 
nanotechnology, this component of the current study permitted us to assess the effects of infor-
mation exposure—albeit in a more argumentative form—on persons of different attributes. 
As in the previous study, we found that the vast majority of the subjects (92%) had heard 
“little” or “nothing” about nanotechnology before the study. Overall, subjects exposed to argu-
mentative information did not form risk perceptions significantly different from those of indi-
viduals not exposed to such arguments. However, as in the previous study, we found that various 
groups exposed to information became polarized relative to groups not exposed to information 
(Table 1). 
 
2 “Nanotechnology is a relatively new form of science that involves the ability to measure, see, predict, and make 
things on the extremely small scale of atoms and molecules. Materials created with nanotechnology can often be 
made to exhibit very different physical, chemical, and biological properties than their normal size counterparts.” The 
instrument used for both stages of the study is attached as an Appendix A. 
3 See Appendix A for the wording of the arguments. 
4 The items included in the scale appear in Appendix A. The scale proved reliable in both conditions, but was more 
so in the argument condition (α = .84) than in the no-argument condition (α = .68). This is not at all surprising, be-
cause so few subjects (8%) had heard more than “a little” about nanotechnology before the study, one would expect 
the perceptions of subjects afforded more information to display greater internal consistency. 
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Mean Risk Perceptions Across Conditions 
 
 
No-Argument 
Condition
Argument 
Condition Diff. Polarization 
Overall 3.64 3.66 .02 NA 
Male 3.52 3.46 -.06
Female 3.76 3.87 .11 .17 
White 3.65 3.59 -.06
Nonwhite 3.64 3.85 .21 .27 
Conservative 3.72 3.65 -.06
Liberal 3.55 3.48 -.07 -.01 
Republican 3.67 3.64 -.04
Democrat 3.60 3.69 .09 .13 
Hierarch 3.65 3.64 -.01
Egalitarian 3.65 3.70 .05 .06 
Individ 3.66 3.57 -.10
Commun 3.63 3.76 .12 .22 
Low Env Fear 3.54 3.48 -.06
High Env Fear 3.76 3.89 .13 .19 
High Know 3.35 2.73 -.61
Low Know 3.67 3.64 -.03 .59 
N ≈ 800, approximately 400 subjects per condition. Risk percep-
tions measured with a 6-point scale. Polarization refers to increase 
in size of difference of mean risk perceptions of paired groups 
across conditions. Boldface type indicates that the degree of polari-
zation so measured was statistically significant (p ≤ .05).  
Table 1. Effects of Unattributed Arguments Across Groups 
One dimension along which polarization occurred was racial. Whereas whites and non-
whites in the no-argument condition held relatively uniform views, nonwhites were significantly 
more fearful than whites in the argument condition (Figure 1). 
Subjects also polarized along cultural lines. Relative to their counterparts in the no-
argument condition, individualists in the argument condition grew less fearful and communi-
tarians grew more fearful. A gulf also emerged between egalitarians and hierarchs and between 
conservatives and liberals, although the size of the degree of polarization was not statistically 
significant in either case. 
Relative to the no-argument condition, women became more concerned, and men less, in 
the argument condition. The degree of cultural polarization measured in terms of mean risk 
scores missed statistical significance. However, a multivariate regression confirmed that being 
female predicted greater concern with nanotechnology risks in the argument condition (Table 2). 
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White, 3.65
Nonwhite, 3.64
No Argument Argument
Risks > Benefits
Risks < Benefits
 
Figure 1. Argument Exposure and Racial Polarization 
 
We also observed polarization among subjects based on their fear of environmental risks 
in general. Using items that measured our subjects’ expressed concerns about global warming 
and nuclear power, we constructed a reliable “environmental fear” scale (α = .77).5 Low-fear 
subjects (those who displayed scores below the median degree of concern on the scale) had a 
higher degree of concern about nanotechnology risks than did high-fear subjects (those who dis-
played scores above the median) in both conditions. But again, the size of the gap between the 
two groups was dramatically larger in the argument condition (Figure 2). In other words, indi-
viduals disposed to worry about environmental risks can be expected to worry about nanotech-
nology when they first learn of it, and to become even more alarmed as they consider arguments 
about its risks and benefits. 
Finally we found cultural polarization based on prior knowledge about nanotechnology. 
“High-knowledge” subjects (those who claimed they knew either a “moderate amount” or “a lot” 
about nanotechnology before the study) had less concern about risk than did “low-knowledge” 
subjects (those who claimed than that they knew “nothing” or “only a little”) in both conditions. 
But the size of the differential was significantly larger in the argument condition.  
                                       
5 See Appendix A for item wording. 
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Low Env Fear, 3.48
High Env Fear, 3.89
Low Env Fear, 3.54
High Env Fear, 3.76
No Argument Argument
 
Figure 2. Effect of Argument Exposure on Subjects Defined by  Environmental Risk-
Sensitivity 
 
As we found in our previous experiment, then, the existing correlation between knowl-
edge about nanotechnology and low concern for risk in the general population does not imply 
causation of the latter by the former. It suggests only that persons inclined to perceive the bene-
fits of nanotechnology are more likely to learn about it on their own. When those who know little 
learn more, in contrast, those predisposed by cultural values or other influences to worry about 
environmental risks become more fearful.6 
                                       
6 The public opinion polls contained in Peter D. Hart Associates (2007) do not demonstrate nearly as striking an 
effect from information exposure. This is not surprising since these polls reflect a within-subjects (“before-and-
after”) design, in which there is a tendency for subjects who initially express one view—particularly ones who ac-
knowledge that they are unfamiliar with the issue in question—to indicate they have altered their position after re-
ceiving information in order to signal the socially desirable trait of open-mindedness. The between-subjects design 
used in this study and in our previous one avoids this effect and thus, we believe, furnishes a more valid indication 
of how information exposure is likely to affect members of the general public, particularly individuals who previ-
ously have not been exposed to comparable information. 
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Conditions:  No Argument   Argument 
Female vs. Male   .097    .076*  
White   .007   -.098**  
Age   .127    .005  
Income  -.103**   -.005  
Education Level  -.058   -.082*  
Republican vs. Democrat   .052    .093**  
Independent vs. Democrat   .005    .053  
Conservative vs. Liberal   .069    .084  
Hierarchy vs. Egalitarianism  -.037    .042  
Individualism vs. Communitarian   .026   -.047  
Prior Knowledge of Nano  -.160***   -.252***  
Environmental Risk Fear    .162***     .266***  
R2    .17      .27   
N ≈ 800, approximately 400 subjects per condition. Dependent variable is 
nanorisk. Regression coefficients are semi-partial correlations. *** p ≤ .01, ** 
p ≤ .05, * p ≤ .10. 
Table 2. Multivariate Regression Analyses of Nanotechnology Risk Perceptions 
 
Stage 2: Credibility and polarization 
The second stage of the study involved an additional 800 subjects. These subjects were 
exposed to the same arguments as those in the argument condition of Stage 1 of the study. Now, 
however, the arguments were randomly assigned to advocates (fictional constructs presented to 
subjects in photographs as “policy experts at major universities”) whom we had determined in 
separate pretests (involving different subjects) were perceived as holding different combinations 
of the values associated with the cultural worldview scales (Figure 3). Thereafter, subjects’ 
views on the risks and benefits of nanotechnology were measured with the same scale used in 
Stage 1 of the study. 
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Hierarchist
Egalitarian
CommunitarianIndividualist
Books:
Three Social Evils: Sexism, Racism, 
and Homophobia 
Raising Children: Avoiding Sexual 
Stereotypes 
People Before Profit! Fixing 
Corporate America 
Society as Family: One for All and 
All for One
Books:
•Against Race and Sex 
Discrimination, For Individual 
Freedom!
•A Free Market Defense of 
Workplace Equality
•Respect for Individual Choice: the 
Cornerstone of a Free and Equal 
Society 
•Stop Treating Us Like Infants: Why 
Government Shouldn't Tell Adults 
What to Do
Books:
•The Immigrant Invasion: Threatening 
the American Way of Life
•The War on American Manhood
•Selfishness Is Not a Vice: Individual 
Freedom and the Public Good
•Why Big Government Doesn't Work
Books:
•The Crisis of Authority: The Assault on 
Traditional Values in America 
•How "Women's Liberation" Hurts Women 
- and Men and Children, too! 
•Community First: Fighting Selfishness in 
American Society 
•The Limits of Individual Rights
 
Figure 3. Culturally Identifiable Policy Advocates 
 
The results revealed that cultural polarization interacts strongly with the relationship be-
tween subjects’ cultural worldviews and the perceived worldviews of those advocating one posi-
tion or another on nanotechnology (Figure 4). This was especially so along the Hierarchy-
Egalitarianism dimension of cultural orientation. When subjects observed an egalitarian policy 
expert defending suspension of nanotechnology development pending additional research on 
risk, and a hierarchical one defending continued development pending such research, cultural 
polarization increased relative to that in the no-argument and argument conditions in stage 1. 
When, however, a hierarchical advocate defended suspension, and an egalitarian advocate de-
fended continued development, subjects holding these respective worldviews swapped positions: 
among subjects confronted with this alignment of arguments and advocates, egalitarians became 
so convinced of nanotechnology’s benefits that they displayed a more positive view of the bal-
ance of benefits and risks than did hierarchs. 
Such a dramatic inversion of the cultural identity of advocates and the cultural resonances 
of arguments is unlikely to be experienced outside the laboratory. Less unrealistic, though, is the 
possibility of a pluralistic-argument environment—one in which advocates of diverse persua-
sions are as likely to be found on one side of the issue as on another. We found that in an ex-
perimental condition in which subjects were equally likely to see hierarchs and egalitarians on 
both sides of the issue—and for that reason seeing arguments among hierarchs and egalitarians 
as ones between them—cultural polarization was essentially eliminated.7 In a pluralistic-
                                       
7 Differences in relative positions across conditions were statistically significant (p < .05). 
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argument environment, disagreement persists, but egalitarians are not significantly more or less 
likely to conclude that nanotechnology benefits predominate over risks than are hierarchs. 
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Figure 4. Impact of Culturally Identifiable Advocates on Hierarchs and Egalitarians 
 
We found similar results along the individualism-communitarian dimension of cultural 
worldviews. When the advocate identifiable as holding a combination of Egalitarian and Com-
munitarian views (Figure 3, lower right) defended suspension of development pending risk re-
search, and the advocate identifiable as a combination of Hierarchical and Individualistic ones 
(Figure 3, upper left) defended continued development, polarization increased, mainly because 
that alignment increased the risk-skepticism of individualists. When the position of these advo-
cates was reversed, polarization diminished. Other argument-advocate pairings produced less-
dramatic results, possibly because a general correlation between individualism and hierarchy 
muted the credibility effect. Finally, in a pluralistic environment—one in which arguments both 
for and against continued development were as likely to be assigned an individualist advocate as 
to a communitarian one—there was, once more, relatively little polarization (Figure 5).8 
                                       
8 Differences in relative positions across conditions were statistically significant (p < .05). 
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Figure 5. Impact of Culturally Identifiable Advocates on Individualists and Communi-
tarians 
 
Conclusion: Lessons Learned and Issues Remaining to Be Investigated 
This most recent study in the CCP/PEN series yields a number of important insights. 
Some of these relate to the understanding of formation of risk perceptions generally. Others 
speak to how information about nanotechnology in particular should be conveyed in order to 
maximize the likelihood that public assessments reflect the best scientific understandings that are 
now available and that will become available in the future on nanotechnology’s risks and bene-
fits. 
The first theoretically interesting lesson from this study relates to the profound signifi-
cance of the cultural credibility heuristic in the formation of beliefs about novel risks. As shown 
in the first CCP/PEN study and confirmed in this one, individuals process information about 
novel risks in diverse ways that reflect their disposition to reach conclusions congenial to their 
cultural values. But the current study shows that this type of biased assimilation appears to be 
much weaker than the tendency of persons to credit the assessments of experts and advocates 
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whose cultural values they share. When those advocates take positions that reinforce individuals’ 
cultural predispositions, the tendency of persons to form views in keeping with those predisposi-
tions is, not surprisingly, accentuated. But when those advocates take positions that contravene 
individuals’ cultural predispositions, the impact of biased assimilation can be counteracted. In-
deed, the normal association between positions on risk and particular cultural orientations can be 
completely inverted when advocates of opposing cultural identities simultaneously adopt posi-
tions contrary to the predispositions of individuals who share their respective outlooks.9 
This finding enriches the general picture of the psychology of cultural cognition. It is 
well-known that individuals use heuristics to compensate for lack of firsthand knowledge with 
complicated issues of risk and for lack of the time and training necessary to acquire knowledge 
through engagement with scientific literature (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky 1982). The theory 
of cultural cognition says that many of these heuristics possess an important connection to indi-
viduals’ core values (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, & Gastil 2006). The CCP/PEN studies of 
nanotechnology suggest that there is natural hierarchy among the heuristics that cultural cogni-
tion comprises. The first study suggested that individuals can make use of even a small bit of 
balanced information to orient themselves very rapidly on a novel issue of risk, likely as a result 
of their responsiveness to affective resonances in that information that allow individuals to as-
similate their attitude toward a novel risk to more-familiar risk issues to which they have a cul-
turally conditioned response (Kahan, Slovic, Braman, Gastil, & Cohen 2007). But that initial 
heuristic judgment, the current study suggests, is not particularly robust. The positions taken by 
particular policy experts who share individuals’ cultural values exert a much stronger heuristic 
influence on individuals as they try to make sense of a novel risk issue. Likely this is so because 
individuals assume that these policy advocates, whom they trust by virtue of a cultural affinity, 
have more knowledge about the risk issue in question than individuals themselves are able to ac-
quire from the content of opposing sets of arguments. Alternatively, or perhaps simply in addi-
tion, the position of the expert might imply that the position the expert is espousing is in fact 
widely held by others who share that advocate’s cultural outlooks, a cue that is likely subcon-
sciously to induce listeners who hold that outlook to gravitate toward that view in order to affirm 
their connection with their cultural peers (Cohen 2003). 
A number of important practical conclusions follow for those interested in assuring 
enlightened public deliberation on the risks and benefits of nanotechnology. One is reinforce-
ment of the lesson that enlightened response to sound information cannot be taken for granted. 
Again, the existing positive correlation that exists between familiarity with nanotechnology and 
the perception that its benefits predominate over its risks in public opinion polls might be 
thought to imply that the simple dissemination of information about nanotechnology will gener-
ate a similarly positive view among that segment of the general population (the vast majority) 
currently unfamiliar with it. That position—which likely misunderstands the causal direction of 
the current relationship between a positive view of nanotechnology and familiarity with it—was 
shown to be false in the first CCP/PEN study. 
 
9 We obtained results similarly dramatic in independent experiments involving the cultural credibility heuristic and 
responses to arguments over the proposal for mandatory vaccination of school-age girls for human papillomavirus 
(Cultural Cognition Project 2007). 
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The current study suggests that the expertise of persons disseminating information about 
nanotechnology also should not necessarily be expected to generate enlightened consensus about 
its risk and benefits. Just as individuals often lack the time and capacity to assess the soundness 
of information on their own, they also often lack the time and capacity to assess the training and 
knowledge of information providers. Moreover, on almost any risk issue of significance—from 
global warming to domestic terrorism, from school shootings to vaccination of school-age girls 
for human papillomavirus—members of the public will be confronted with dueling advocates 
whose expert credentials (scientific training, university affiliations, and the like) are roughly 
comparable. In that situation, they will almost certainly decide whom to trust in exactly the way 
they normally do, namely, by assessing who it is in the debate at hand who seems most like 
themselves. That judgment of likeness will almost certainly involve a tacit judgment of cultural 
affinity. 
The impact of this cultural credibility heuristic can easily amplify the polarizing impact 
of simple information dissemination. The same forces that motivate individuals generally to 
adopt positions on risk issues that are congenial to their cultural outlooks can induce policy ad-
vocates to do so. As a result, a deliberative climate can emerge in which members of the public 
consistently see advocates they culturally identify with presenting arguments those members of 
the public are culturally predisposed to accept, and advocates they do not identify with present-
ing arguments they are culturally predisposed to reject. The state of public division that emerges 
when members of the public are impelled simultaneously by the combined forces of biased as-
similation and cultural credibility makes the prospect for convergence on sound scientific infor-
mation exceedingly remote. 
Nevertheless, the results of the current study also vindicate the supposition that the polar-
izing tendencies of cultural cognition are not immutable. Precisely because the cultural credibil-
ity heuristic seems to exert greater force than the power of biased assimilation, it can, at least 
theoretically, be harnessed to counteract polarization. 
The results of stage 2 of the study suggest that it is imperative that those who have a stake 
in enlightened public assessment of nanotechnology attend not just to what is said about its risks 
and benefits but also to who says it. It is critical that care be taken to avoid creating the impres-
sion in the mind of the public that one or another position on nanotechnology is strongly associ-
ated with one or another cultural outlook. Such an impression can easily arise by accident; in-
deed, it is likely in the nature of things for such an impression to emerge. To counteract it, pro-
ponents of enlightened decisionmaking should make a conscious effort to include as information 
providers experts and other risk communicators whom persons of diverse cultural outlooks will 
identify with and hence trust. 
Even if it is a necessary part of any strategy to promote enlightened public deliberation 
on nanotechnology, securing a culturally pluralistic argument environment of this sort is unlikely 
to be sufficient. Studies suggest that information-framing techniques—in particular ones that af-
firm, rather than threaten, individuals’ cultural values—also make a vital contribution to guaran-
teeing that individuals of diverse outlooks remain maximally receptive to sound information 
(Cultural Cognition Project 2007). In the absence of message framings that make sound informa-
tion about nanotechnology’s risk and benefits congenial to persons of diverse cultural outlooks, it 
will likely be impossible to foster or maintain culturally pluralistic advocacy of such information. 
Accordingly, experimental studies currently being conducted by CCP and PEN are aimed spe-
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cifically at adapting to nanotechnology information the sorts of identity-affirming framing tech-
niques that have been used in other contexts. 
Differences of opinion, to be worked out in the normal course of democratic decision-
making, will almost certainly be a part of the future of nanotechnology in the United States. This 
will be so, at a minimum, because people naturally place different values on the myriad benefits 
that nanotechnology might confer and also on avoiding the types of risks that it might entail. 
But no matter how they come out on these questions, citizens of diverse values have a 
common interest in ensuring that their deliberations are informed by the very best understanding 
of nanotechnology’s risks and benefits that science is able to attain. They have a common inter-
est, then, in creating a deliberative climate that is free of influences that impede their capacity to 
recognize what that information is. 
The CCP/PEN studies show that the dynamics of cultural cognition can be one of those 
influences. But the studies also show that it is possible to devise procedures of information dis-
semination that counteract this source of distortion. Continued development of a comprehensive 
strategy for furnishing information accessible to persons of diverse cultural outlooks should be 
among the highest priorities of those who want to promote enlightened public debate on this im-
portant and novel science. 
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Appendix A. Select Experiment Survey Instrument Items 
 
1. Cultural Orientation Scales 
Six-point response scale for all items: Strongly Disagree, Moderately Disagree, Slightly 
Disagree, Slightly Agree, Moderately Agree, and Strongly Agree. 
Individualism-Solidarism Scale 
1. IINTRSTS. The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives. 
2. SHARM. Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people from hurting 
themselves.  
3. IPROTECT. It's not the government's business to try to protect people from them-
selves.  
4. IPRIVACY. The government should stop telling people how to live their lives.  
5. SPROTECT. The government should do more to advance society's goals, even if 
that means limiting the freedom and choices of individuals.  
6. SLIMCHOI. Government should put limits on the choices individuals can make so 
they don't get in the way of what's good for society.  
7. SNEEDS. It's society's responsibility to make sure everyone's basic needs are met. 
8. INEEDY. It's a mistake to ask society to help every person in need.  
9. SRELY. People should be able to rely on the government for help when they need 
it.  
10. IRESPON. Society works best when it lets individuals take responsibility for their 
own lives without telling them what to do.  
11. ITRIES. Our government tries to do too many things for too many people. We 
should just let people take care of themselves.  
12. IFIX. If the government spent less time trying to fix everyone's problems, we'd all 
be a lot better off.  
13. IENJOY. People who are successful in business have a right to enjoy their wealth as 
they see fit. 
14. IMKT. Free markets—not government programs—are the best way to supply peo-
ple with the things they need.  
15. IPROFIT. Private profit is the main motive for hard work.  
16. IGOVWAST. Government regulations are almost always a waste of everyone's time 
and money.  
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Hierarchy-Egalitarianism Scale 
1. HEQUAL. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.  
2. HREVDIS1. Nowadays it seems like there is just as much discrimination 
against whites as there is against blacks.  
3. EWEALTH. Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth was 
more equal.  
4. ERADEQ. We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between the rich and the 
poor, whites and people of color, and men and women.  
5. EDISCRIM. Discrimination against minorities is still a very serious problem in 
our society.  
6. HREVDIS2. It seems like blacks, women, homosexuals and other groups don't 
want equal rights, they want special rights just for them.  
7. HCHEATS. It seems like the criminals and welfare cheats get all the breaks, 
while the average citizen picks up the tab.  
8. EDIVERS. It's old-fashioned and wrong to think that one culture's set of values 
is better than any other culture's way of seeing the world.  
9. HWMNRTS. The women's rights movement has gone too far.  
10. ESEXIST. We live in a sexist society that that is fundamentally set up to dis-
criminate against women.  
11. HTRADFAM. A lot of problems in our society today come from the decline in 
the traditional family, where the man works and the woman stays home.  
12. HFEMININ. Society as a whole has become too soft and feminine.  
13. EROUGH. Parents should encourage young boys to be more sensitive and less 
rough and tough. 
 
2. Environmental Risk Items 
Six-point response scale for all items: Strongly Disagree, Moderately Disagree, Slightly 
Disagree, Slightly Agree, Moderately Agree, and Strongly Agree. 
1. GWPOLICY. It is important to take steps to reduce global warming. 
2. GWRISK. Global warming poses a serious environmental risk.  
3. NUCDANGER. It is dangerous to live near a nuclear power plant. 
 
3. Nanotechnology Familiarity Item 
PRIORKNOW. Before today, how much would you say you knew about nanotech-
nology? [Nothing, A Little, A Moderate Amount, A Lot] 
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4. Balanced Arguments 
 
Juxtaposed and rotated; assign randomly to advocates in Stage 2 credibility experiment. 
 
Develop Now, Regulate later. Nanotechnology 
is likely to create immense benefits for society. 
Some examples are food containers that kill 
bacteria, stain-resistant clothing, high-
performance sporting goods, faster and smaller 
computers, and more effective skincare prod-
ucts and sunscreens. Nanotechnology also has 
the potential to create better ways to treat dis-
ease, clean up the environment, enhance na-
tional security, and provide cheaper energy. 
It’s fine for government to study and monitor 
the nanotechnology industry as it develops. But 
if restrictive government regulations discour-
age companies from making the necessary 
start-up investments in this new technology, 
society will suffer for sure. 
Regulate Now, Develop Later. While there’s 
no conclusive evidence yet on the potential 
risks of nanotechnology, there are many rea-
sonable concerns about it. For example, no one 
knows for sure whether release of nanomateri-
als could damage the environment, or whether 
nanomaterials could harm humans when 
breathed in or absorbed through the skin. It’s 
also possible that invisible nanotechnology-
based monitoring devices could pose a threat to 
national security or lead to invasions of per-
sonal privacy. It’s just common sense to wait 
until these issues have been investigated and 
resolved before allowing commercial devel-
opment of products using nanotechnologies. 
 
5. Nanotechnology Risk-Benefit Items  
Six-point response scale for all items: Strongly Disagree, Moderately Disagree, Slightly 
Disagree, Slightly Agree, Moderately Agree, and Strongly Agree. 
1. NANOBENEFIT. The benefits of nanotechnology are likely to be very large. 
2. NANORISK. The risks of nanotechnology are likely to be very large. 
3. NANOBALANCE. On the whole, the benefits of nanotechnology will outweigh 
the risks. 
4. SAFETYFIRST. Government should prohibit commercial development of na-
notechnology until studies have been done on how to control any risks nanotechnology 
might involve. 
5. GOFORIT. Restricting commercial development of nanotechnology until more 
studies are done is a bad idea because it will discourage essential investments in the nano-
technology industry. 
6. PRECAUTION. In the face of uncertainty about risk, the best course of action is 
to conduct safety studies before allowing nanotechnology to be developed. 
7. OPPCOST. Preventing development of nanotechnology while safety studies are 
being done will deprive society of too many potential benefits from nanotechnology. 
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Appendix B. Study Sample. 
1. Knowledge Networks 
Study subjects consisted of a nationally representative general population sample of ap-
proximately 1,600 Americans who were recruited by Knowledge Networks and who participated 
in study experiments via Knowledge Network’s on-line testing facilities. Knowledge Networks 
(http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/) is a public opinion research firm with offices located 
throughout the United States. It maintains an active respondent pool of some 40,000 persons who 
are recruited to participate in on-line surveys and experiments administered on behalf of aca-
demic and governmental researchers and private businesses. Knowledge Network respondents 
agree to participate in three to four surveys per month in exchange for Internet access and other 
forms of compensation. It uses recruitment and sampling methods that assure a diverse sample 
that is demographically representative of the U.S. population. Numerous studies have concluded 
that on-line testing of Knowledge Network samples generates results equivalent in their reliabil-
ity to conventional random-digit-dial surveys 
(http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/2005aapor.html, and studies using Knowledge Net-
works facilities are routinely published in peer-reviewed academic journals 
(http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/docs/List%20of%20Journals%208-28-2006.pdf).  
 
2. Demographic composition of sample for this study 
a. Gender: 51% female, 49% male. 
c. Race: 73% white, 9% African-American. 
d. Average age: 47 years. 
e. Median household income: $35,000 to $40,000. 
f. Median education level: Some college. 
